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A large literature has developed concerning  the evaluation of  the
social desirability  of undertaking actions which irrevocably will alter
unique natural environmental  resources.
The consideration of uncertainty  in this  context has  led to  the concepts
of option value and quasi-option value  (QOV).  The  former  concept concerns
2/
the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post welfare evaluation measures.-
The latter concept, with which this paper is  concerned, has to  do with
the impact on investment criteria of opportunities  for  learning which might
eliminate or reduce uncertainty.  In particular, Arrow and Fisher  (1974)
demonstrated that  decisions with learning appropriately are more conserva-
tive  than decisions made when learning possibilities do not exist or are
ignored.
While the implications of  the analysis are clear, the definition of
QOV is not.  Arrow and Fisher identified QOV as  "a reduction  in net benefits
from development"  (1974,  p. 315).  Similarly, Henry  (1974a) defined an
"irreversibility effect," which is  a reduction in  the expected net benefits
of development when uncertainty and learning are recognized relative to
the certainty case.  However, other authors have identified QOV as  the
quantity which, if  incorporated into  the decision rule regarding development
used in the non-learning case, would  lead  to  the same decision rule in  the
learning case  (Krutilla and Fisher,  1975,  p. 72).  This approach is  taken2
by Bernanke  (1983) where  there are several possible investments.  In  this
latter sense, QOV is  seen as a "shadow tax" on development which leads to
efficient investment decisions.
Unfortunately, the models employed by Arrow, Krutilla, and Fisher were
simple and such that  the relationship between these alternative definitions
of QOV is  obfuscated.  In particular,  they assumed  the  the area of  land
available for development  is equal  to  one and  that benefit functions are
linear so that either all of  the area or none of  it  is  developed.
In a different setting in which the benefit of holding  given stocks
of  developed and preserved land is given by a strictly concave function,
and a "zero or  one" restriction  is not imposed, one  is presented by a more
obvious choice between definitions of  QOV, and the distinction between the
"net benefits" and "shadow tax" approaches  is  clear.  In  this framework,
the former  definition is  seen to be equivalent  to  the expected value of
information as  defined in utility terms by,  for example, Gould  (1934).
Conrad  (1980) points out  that  the two  ideas are equivalent.  Hanemann  (1983)
correctly notes that  this value  is conditional on no  development in  the
first period.
I propose  that the Krutilla/Fisher shadow tax definition be given
the name quasi-option tax  (QOT) and  that  the term quasi-option value (QOV)
be maintained when discussing  changes in net benefits.  Hence,  throughout
the paper, I refer to  these  two concepts without, I hope, risk of con-
fusion.
First,  I explore a fairly general model of  investment decisions under
uncertainty with learning and derive an expression  that corresponds  to  the
shadow tax definition offered by Krutilla and Fisher in the  linear case.3
I show how this differs  from the usual definition of  the QOV.-/ In particu-
lar, I propose an operational definition of QOT when the choice set is  the
continuum  [0,1],  and not equal to {0,1},  as  is  usual in the literature.
Hanemann  (1983) notes  the distinction between the QOV and shadow tax con-
cepts  (defined differently than is  done here) in this  context and  states
that the concept,  therefore, is not well defined.  However, that two distinct
concepts exist which are equal in one special case does not obviate  their
usefulness.  Bernanke  (1983) proposed a measure similar to  that studied
here.  However, he considers a menu of projects which can be either imple-
mented on deferred and considers the problem of choice  from among these
alternatives.  He incorrectly associates his measure with QOV  (this  is
noted by Hanemann (1983)).
Second, I investigate  the properties of  the QOV and what I propose as
QOT.  In particular, I am interested in how QOT responds to  an increase
in risk as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz  (1970).
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I outline
the basic model of QOV following Arrow and Fisher  (1974).  The  simplest
model is  presented and  the distinction between QOT and the QOV is drawn.
I also show how  these can be  the same in magnitude in this  simple case.
The relationship between the QOV and QOT is  obscured  in a model with
linear benefit functions.  In  the third  section of  the paper, I study  a
model with concave benefit  functions and many possible realizations of
the state of nature;  however, I retain the assumption of  two  time periods
as well as that  concerning perfect information.  This section serves  two
purposes.  First,  it  serves  as a forum for  the demonstration of  the
intuitively pleasing result  that, when benefit  functions are strictly4
concave, less of  a natural environmental resource is  developed when learning
is  anticipated than when learning cannot take place.  The method of proof
is  alternative to  that presented  in Arrow and Fisher  (1974).  The mode
of proof used here provides a clear idea of  the difference between the
QOV and QOT;  this  is  the second purpose of  the section.
The comparison of no information to perfect  information is  a special
case of  the  comparison of "better" information.  In the fourth section of
the paper, I examine the effect that an ability  to obtain better information
has  on irreversible  investment decisions.  In other respects, the model is
the same as  that studied in  the previous section.  The approach taken here
is  to  apply the concept  to  a "more informative" experiment  as found in
Marschak and Miyasawa  (1968)  in a dynamic setting via dynamic programming
arguments.  The exposition here follows  closely that of Epstein  (1980).
The fifth section extends  the inquiries of  the previous  section to
a multi-period model.  The extension is  straightforward and requires only
a change of  interpretation.  The  final  section is a discussion.
Quasi-Option Tax and Quasi-Option Value
The existence of  QOT and its relationship  to  quasi-option value  (QOV)
in  the linear case  easily is  demonstrated in a model with two periods,  two
possible states of nature,  and perfect information.  The presentation here
follows Arrow and Fisher  (1974)  conceptually, but  the details of  their
analysis are modified to provide a closer tie to  subsequent investigations
in this chapter.
There is a tract of homogeneous underdeveloped area  the  size of
which is  normalized to one.  The amount of new development in period t
is qt  for t  =1,2.  The net benefits of development and preservation per5
unit of area per unit of time are Dt and Pt, respectively.  It  is assumed
that, while D1 and D2 are known, the values of Pt are not known.  As with
models of investment by a competitive firm under uncertainty, the timing
of any resolution of uncertainty relative to  the time when input  choices
must be made is  crucial in the determination of  the results  of  the
analysis. / Here,  I assume that P1 is  known when ql must be chosen.  I
then compare two cases, one in which no information concerning P2 is
forthcoming, and one in which P2 is  known with certainty, before q2 must
be chosen.
I assume that ex ante the decision-maker  (DM)  believes  (correctly)
that P2 is  "small" with probability I  and  that it  is "large" with
probability 1-E.5/ The realization P2 is small in that D -PS  is  strictly
2  2  2
positive; Ph is  large in that D2-Ph is  strictly negative.
2 First I examine  the case  in which no new information about P2 is
available to the DM until after q2 must be decided upon.  Then both q
and q2 are chosen at  the initial date.  The DM is assumed  to be risk-
neutral; thus,  the objective  function is the expected present value of
net benefits.  The DM's  point estimate of P2,  conditioned on information
available at the beginning of the program, is P2,  i.e.,  P2 = IIP2  +  (1-n)P2.
The DM solves
max  Dlq  +  (l-ql)P1 + a[D 2 (ql+q2) + (1-ql-q2)P2]
ql q2
s.t.  ql£[0,l],  q2e[0,1-q]
where a=(l+i)-l  and i is  the decision-maker's rate of time preference.6
Define V1=D1-P1 and V2=D2-P2. Clearly, the optimal plan includes
for q2
0  if V  <  0
q  2  all q1 [0,1],  (1) l=q1 if V2  > 0
Turning to  the decision in  the first period, the decision rule is  given by
1  if V2 <  0  V1 >  laV21
0  if V2 <  0  V1 <  JaV21
q  =  (2) 1 if V2 > 0  V2 > 0
0  if V  > 0  V1 < 0.
Now, suppose that  the decision-maker recognizes  that the true value of P2
will be revealed  at  the beginning of period  two.  In this case,  the
decision on q2 can be made after P2 is  known.  Let V2 denote the true
value of D2-P2. The decision rule on q2  (the superscript on the variable
denotes  that it  is  chosen via a sequential decision procedure) is  given
by (1)  replacing V2 by V2. The decision rule concerning qI is derived
by comparing the expected payoff with q; >  0 to  the expected payoff with
ql  0  when the optimal  decision rule for  q2  is used.  In the former case
the expected payoff is
qD 1 +  (l-qs)P 1 + a {ID 2 +  (1-I)[qlD2 +  (l-ql)P]}.  (3)
If, on the other hand, ql-O,  the expected payoff is
P1 + a [D 2 +  (1-h)P].  (4)
Subtracting (4) from (3)  yields
1qD  - ql 1 + a(l-E)qD 2 - a(l-lI)qsPh
Clearly,  =  1  if  (5)  is positive,  while q  =  if  (5)  is  negative.
Clearly, q  = 1 if  (5) is positive, while ql  0 if  (5) is  negative.7
Rearranging, the rule is
s*  =  1 if V1 > a(l-)(P  D2)  (6)
1  0 if V1 < a(l-I)(Ph  - D2 ).
By assumption, a(l-H)(Ph-D2)  is a positive number.  The existence of QOV
is demonstrated by comparing (2) and (6);  i.e.,  by comparing decision
rules when opportunities for learning are ignored with decision rules
for sequential decisions.  Suppose V2 > O.  Then from the last  two lines
of the RHS of (2) we have
q  = 1 if V1 > 0
q* - 0 if V1 < 0
as  the decision rule ignoring learning, and  (6) in the sequential case.
When opportunities  for learning exist, V1 must be higher for development
to be indicated than it must be if  these opportunities  either do  not exist
or are ignored.  The amount by which initial development benefits must be
higher  is just  a(l-fl)(Ph-D 2),  the expected present value of the loss if
an irreversible decision is undertaken and the state of nature that
obtains  is such that the decision-maker would reverse the decision if
(s)he could;  this number is the QOT.
It  is  apparent  that this "shadow tax" approach to QOT bears a
resemblance to  the concept of  the value of information.  Here, I follow
Gould (1974) in  defining the expected value of perfect information.  A
decision-maker chooses a decision xcX and obtains a payoff of U(x,z) where
zEZ  is a random variable with distribution function F(z).  In the absence
of information, the decision-maker maximizes the expected payoff,  i.e.,
(s)he solves
max  f  U(x,z)dF(z).  (7)
xsX  Z8
Let x denote the solution to  this problem.  Now, suppose that the decision-
maker can obtain perfect information about z before choosing x.  Let x* z
denote the optimal choice in this case.  Then, before the information
actually  is  obtained the expected payoff with information is
/  U(x*,z)dF(z).  (8)
z
The expected value of perfect information is defined as  the difference
A
between (8) and (7) evaluated at  x, i.e.,
VOI  - U(x*,z)dF(z)  - f  U(x,z)dF(z).  (9)
Z  Z
It  is  easy to show that VOI > 0 (see Gould, 1974, p. 67).  This makes
intuitive sense, as  the result says  that obtaining information costlessly
can never make the decision-maker worse off.
To  compare this definition to the concept of QOT developed above,
I introduce the following notation.  Let EoPV(1) be the expected present
value of the payoff in the problem discussed previously when opportunities
for learning are ignored and the decision in the first period is  to develop
all of the area.  Similarly, define E PVCO)  as this present value when
the initial decision is to develop none of the area.  When a sequential
decision procedure is used, denote the expected payoffs by EsPV(l)  and
E PV(0).
Suppose that E PV(1) > E PV(O)  and the "ignorance case" yields full
development of the area at the initial date.  The lesson of the previous
analysis  is that even if this  is the case, it may be that EsPV(.)  > EsPV(l),
i.e.,  even if  it  is optimal to develop in the ignorance case it may be
optimal to  refrain from development in the learning case.  Assume that
these two inequalities hold.9
Since the definition of VOI forwarded above uses  the expected pay-
offs evaluated at optimal choices, with the assumption of the previous
paragraph, one would define
VOl = E PV(O) - E PV(l).  (10)
S  0
Applying this  definition to  the problem studies in the previous section,
VOI = P  + a[ID 2 - (l-I)P2] - D1 aD2
(11)
= P  - D1 + a(l-II) (P-D2)
Recalling the discussion above, the second term on the RHS of  (11) is  the
QOT for the problem and it  is  immediate that,  in general, QOTOVOI.
One difference in the two concepts arises  from the fact that the  QOV
allows the choice variable to  take on its maximizing value in both the
learning and ignorance cases.  On the other hand, QOT  in this linear case
seems to be the difference between the expected payoff with learning and
the expected payoff under ignorance when ql=O in both cases.
In this linear model, QOT restricts the assessment to  the choice
ql 0 in both cases, i.e.,
QOT - E PV(O)  - E PV(O).  (12)
Subtracting (10)  from (12),
QOT - VOI - E PV(l)  - E  PV(O),
o  o
or, more suggestively,
QOT - VOI - EoPV(q*) - E PV(O).  (13)10
In the linear case, equality will hold in (13)  if the optimal choices in
the two cases coincide.  Implicitly, Conrad assumed q-*qs*-O and this explains
why he was able to  present a numerical example with QOT-VOI even though the
two concepts are distinct.
The two ideas are associated with different questions.  The VOI
examines the difference in expected total payoff in the learning and
ignorance cases and hence is concerned with the expected value of the
indirect utility function.  QOT, on the other hand, examines  the bias
that arises in the decision rule used  to make initial development choices,
i.e.,  QOT is a marginal concept.  It  seeks the adjustment to  initial
development benefits in the learning case that would lead to'the same
level of initial development  as in the ignorance case.
One problem here is  that, in a linear model, totals  and marginals
easily are confused when the upper bound on initial development is  chosen
to be one.  The difference between QOT and VOI is more readily seen in a
model with strictly concave benefit functions.  In the next  section of
the paper I study such a model, while retaining the two-period and
perfect  information assumptions.
A More General Two-Period Model
In  this  section I change my notation somewhat.  As before, qt is
the amount of new development in period t.  Now, define Dt =  tq  and
Pt-l-Dt;  here, D and P are areas of land and not unit benefits  as  in the
previous section.  The net benefits  of any given level of development
are given by the function UCDt,Pt,zt) where zt is a parameter that cannot
be observed by the DM.  I assume that, for any given value of z, U is11
thrice continuously differentiable,  strictly increasing in D and in P,
and strictly concave in (D,P) on all of its domain, the closed unit inter-
val.  Moreover,  for convenience, I assume
lim  aU/aD = X  lim  aU/aP  (14)
D+O  P+0
Perfect information is obtained by performing an experiment Y
which provides a message y that  is  perfectly correlated with z;  that  is,
observation of y tells the DM exactly what z*,  the true value of z, is.
Obviously, this  is a special case of an experiment which provides noisy
information about z, the implications of which will be addressed in the
following section of the chapter.
As  in the previous  section, z* is known to  lie in a set Z.  The
DM's  subjective beliefs about z are summarized by the prior probability
distribution function F(z).  Here, the set Z could contain either a finite,
countable, or uncountably infinite number of elements.
Consider first the case with no experimentation  in which the message
system Y either doesn't exist, or is  ignored.  The DM solves
£t-2 t-1
max  2  a  U(Dt,l-Dt,z)dF(z)
ql,q2  tl-  Z 
s.t.  D  =  Zq
Dt  [0,1]
qt  >0.
Since the problem is stationary, the DM chooses q to solve
max  f  U(q,l-q,z)dF(z).
Z12
By assumption, U  is  linear in z;  hence, by Jensen's  Inequality, this prob-
lem is  equivalent to
max  U(q,l-q,  f  zdF(z))  = U(q,l-q,1).  (16)
Z
Let  q be a solution to this problem;  previous assumptions ensure
that q exists and  is unique.  The optimal policy for the non-experimenting
DM, then,  is  to set  (ql,q2)=(q,0).
Next, consider the problem in which experimentation reveals  z*
before q2 is  chosen.  In period 2 the DM solves
max  U(ql+q2 1,lql-q 2z*).  (17)
0  q2 <  l-q 1
Denote the solution (which exists  and is unique)  to this  problem by q*(ql,z*),
and define the indirect utility function
V(ql,z*) = U(ql+q*(qlz*),l-ql-q2(ql,z*),z*).  (18)
Lemma 1.  V(q,z)  is differentiable and non-increasing in q.
Proof:  That V is differentiable  follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem, which implies  that  q*(.)  is a C( ) function.  To show that V is
non-increasing, note that, by (14) q2 < 1-ql.  Hence, the conditions
(necessary and sufficient)  characterizing q* are
au
2 q2 (q1 +  q2* l-ql - q,z*)  = 0.  (19b)
q [  qaq  - q~,z*)J  = 0.  (19b)
q.e.d.
Lemma 1 is  quite intuitive.  If, having inherited ql, more develop-
ment in the second period is undertaken, then a marginal change in ql
does not affect the DM's utility,  since ql and q2 are perfect substitutes.13
If,  on the other hand, q* is zero given ql,  the non-negativity  constraint
is binding.  Then, increasing ql  tightens this constraint making the DM
worse off.
Given that an optimal policy is  to be used in  the second period,
standard dynamic programming arguments (i.e.,  the Principle of Optimality)
tells us that the solution to  the first-period investment problem is
obtained by solving
max  f  U(ql,l-ql,z)dF(z) + a  f  V(ql,z)dF(z)  (20)
ql  Z  Z
Denote the solution to this problem by q*.  The key result of this section
is the demonstration that, if learning is  anticipated, less development is
undertaken in the first period.
A
Theorem 1.  q*  <  q.  Further, if there exists z such that
UD(q,l-q,z)  - Up(q,l-q,z) < 0 and F'(1) > O, then q* < q.
Proof:  Suppose  the contrary, i.e.,  that q* > q.  Since q is  the
unique maximizer of first period expected payoffs,
I  U(q,l-q,z)dFCz)  >  f  U(qt,l-q*,z)dF(z).
Z  Z
By Lemma 1, V(q,z)  >  V(q*,z) for all  z.  Hence,
/  V(q,z)dF(z)  > f V(q*,z)dF(z).
Z  Z
Adding these provides
U(q,l-q,z)+a  £  F(q,z)dF(z) >  I  U(q*,l-q*,z)dFCz)
Z  Z
+a  I  V(q*,z)dF(z).
Z
lk14
But, by assumption, q* is maximal, a contradiction.
To prove the second part,  the first order conditions for  the problem
(20)  are, since q* is interior  to  [0,1]  by (14),
U (q*,l-q ,Z)-U (q*,l-qlz)
(21)
+ a  f  V  (q*,z)dF(z) = 0.
Z  q1
By hypothesis the last  term on the LHS is  strictly negative since
V  < 0 for all z and V  < 0 for z,where z arises with positive prob-
ql  ql
ability.  Recalling the definition of q,
UD(q,l-q,z) - Up(ql-qz) =  0.
The result follows from the strict concavity of U.
q.e.d.
Now, consider the Krutilla/Fisher shadow-tax definition of QOT.
Suppose a DM who ignores opportunities for learning when they exist and
who acts myopically to maximize first period expected payoffs must pay
a tax of T per unit of development undertaken.  This DM solves
max  U(q,l-q,z) - Tq.
q
The solution to  this problem is,  of course,
UD(q,l-q,z) - UpCq,l-q,z) - T =  0.  (22)
Clearly, if the tax is set such that
T =  -a  Z  as  (ql'z)dF(z),
the DM who ignores  learning is led  to an efficient investment decision
since,in this case,  (22)  and the first order conditions for  (20)  (given by15
(21))  coincide.  Since U(-)  is strictly concave,  the solutions  to  the
problems must coincide as well.  Thus, since I propose that QOT be defined
as in Krutilla and Fisher (1975),  I propose
QOT - -a  a  (qlz)dF(z).
Z  q1 
It provides some intuition into  this definition if it  is noted that,
while the integral is  taken over all of Z, the derivative under the
integral is  zero for a subset of Z and  the numerical value of QOT
is unchanged if  this set is  deleted.  Define
Z  - {z:  UCq,l-qz)-Up(ql-qz)  <  O}.
The set Z is  the subset of Z such that,  if  z*EZ and the myopically
profitable level of development is undertaken in the first period, then
no new development would be undertaken in the second period.  Hence,
-QOT - a  q,z)dF(z).
Z  q  lz)dFz) 
This  formulation makes  it clear that QOT is  the expected present value
of the second period loss if an irreversible decision is  implemented at
its myopically profitable level, where the loss  is averaged over the
possible states of nature under which the DM would reverse his/her
decision if he/she could.  This, of  course, is just  the interpretation
given in the previous section of the paper.  It  is apparent  that the two
formulations are equivalent.
This also makes  clear the role played by the assumption which leads
to the conclusion that q* < q, i.e.,  that Z has a non-empty subset with
positive measure.  Obviously, if  it  is not possible to  find out that an
ex ante decision is  incorrect, then the prospect of "learning" will not16
affect that decision.  Equally obviously, the VOI in this case is  zero
as well.
Further intuition can be gained with the aid of a diagram.  In
Figure 1 the marginal benefit functions are depicted.  The myopic invest-
ment level qm occurs where expected marginal net benefits of investment
are zero, i.e.,  where aU/aD =  aU/3P.  If,  in the learning case,  there
exists a value of z such that reversing some initial development would
be desired, and  this z arises with positive probability, then QOT is
positive.  QOT drives a  wedge between marginal first period development
and preservation benefits, and it  is optimal to  develop less of the area
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FIGURE  1.  Optimal'and  Myopic  Investment17
In the model outlined above,  I assumed that  the utility function and
unknown parameter of both are stationary.  In the context of the determin-
istic natural environments literature discussed in  the introduction of the
paper, this assumption may not be warranted.  To  incorporate  the possi-
bility of preferences changing over time,  I now allow z to vary through
time.  The most important change in the analysis is  that,  in general,  the
optimal policy in  the non-learning case  no  longer is of the  form (q,0).
Let the probability distribution on z  be denoted by Ft(zt)  and define _  t
t=  f  ztF  (z  ).
z  t
The  non-experimenting  DM  solves
max  U(ql,l-ql,z 1 ) + aU(ql+q2,1-ql-q2 ,z 2).  (23)
qlq2
Let  (ql,q2) be the solution  to  (23)  and  let J(ql,q2 ) be the  indirect
objective function.  Naturally, the solution vector satisfies  (recall  (14))
= 0  (24) <  0
°  <  q2 [[-J-]  =0  (25)
2  2
It  is  important to note  that the problem  (23)  is  a two-period version
of  the problem considered by Fisher, Krutilla,  and  Cicchetti  (1972).  Sup-
pose that q2  >  0.  Then,  J/3q2 =  0.  Using  (24)  and  the definition of  J,
it  is  immediate that
UD(q,l-ql, 1 ) - Up(q,l-'ql,1 )  =  0  (26)18
But  this is  just the condition satisfied by the myopic level of  initial
development qm where marginal net benefits of  first period development
are zero.
This discussion indicates  that  ql=q  if, given  qm,  it  is  expected
that more development would be indicated in the second period of the
program.  One might call  this an "expected  free interval" since the DM
is  free to invest at  the myopically profitable level in the first period.
If,  on the other hand, one expects q2=0  given ql=q  ,  then
UDvPll-qlzl)-Up(Vqll-1qlZ
) +  a/aq2  =  0
and it  follows  that q < qm  Disinvestment  (q2 < 0) is  desired, but  this
action is blocked by  the irreversibility constraint.  Along this "expected
blocked interval" current investment  is curtailed to a level smaller than
the myopic level of  investment.  This  is  the Arrow (1968) result  that it
may be optimal to  refrain from myopically profitable investment if
disinvestment, which is  impossible, would be desired in  the near future.
Naturally, if  the DM is  risk neutral and no learning is  anticipated,
it  is not surprising that the DM may replace the unknown parameter z by
its expected value in each period and proceed to undertake a Fisher, Krutilla,
Cicchetti benefit-cost analysis.  The crux of this section of the chapter is
to show that this  certainty equivalence result does not hold when learning
is  anticipated.  I wish to show that q* < q1.
There are three possible cases to consider.  The first case is  trivial:
Suppose that,  for all z2 that arise with positive probability, one has
m  qm  >  (27)
UD(q..1 -ql  z2) - Up(-ql,1-ql,z2) 
> 0  (27)19
m
where q1 is  the myopic investment level  for the  first period, i.e. qi
is defined by
UD(q-lqi,zi)  Up(qil-q,z)  = 0  i=1,2  (28)
Then, qq =  2 - q  for all z  and clearly q  = q  This is  the case where
there is nothing to be  learned and ql = q1
= q.  One might call  this a
"sure free interval."
The second case  is  equally as trivial as  the first;  here, assume
q1  < q.  Then q1 = ql  and Theorem 1 holds, since subscripting z by t
appropriately does not affect  its proof.  This  is  the expected  free inter-
val case.
The third case is more interesting;  further, it corresponds  to  the
situation envisioned by Fisher, Krutilla, and Cicchetti  (1972).  In this
case an expected blocked interval exists,  i.e.,  ql > q2.  Now, by the
discussion above, ql < ql.  The proof of  Theorem 1 no longer applies since
6/
it cannot be concluded that  ql maximizes  first period utility.
I will defer the proof of  the proposition that  q* < ql in this case
until the next section of the paper.  There I show that q  < ql in a more
general case of  less  than complete resolution of uncertainty when learning
takes place.  The third case here naturally holds as  a special case of that
more general model.-
Imperfect Information
To characterize  the uncertainty in the problem and the possible
receipt of information, I follow the approach of Marschak and Miyasawa
(1968).8/  In particular, I assume  that the decision-maker holds subjec-
tive beliefs about  the  true value of the parameter zt,  beliefs given by
the prior probabilities  (t-l  ...' H  tn)' where20
Pti  Prob(zt=zti)
The decision-maker is  able to perform an experiment Y, which
provides  information about  the true value of z2 . The set of possible
messages corresponding to Y  is  (Y 1,  '...  Ym).  The tie between the
experiment and the parameter is  provided by the likelihood matrix
A =  [6ij] = Prob(Y=yiz2=z2j),
Then, the posterior probabilities are found via Bayes' Theorem.  The
matrix of posterior probabilities  is  denoted by
e =  [9ij] = Prob(z2=z2iY=yj).
Let  the joint distribution of Y and z2 be  .ij  and the marginal distribu-
tion of Y be Aj, i.e.,  Xj=Prob(Y=yj).  Then
j = Zi  = Z  "2i  j
and
ij  = 6ij  2i  ii  j
If a particular message yj  is obtained from performing the experiment,
then the conditional distribution of z2 is provided by  the jth column of
the matrix  [6ij];  this can be obtained via knowledge of either the joint
distribution or the likelihood matrix.
Consider a general decision problem in which a payoff of w(x,z) is
realized if  a decision xEX  is  chosen and the  true state of  the world is  z.
If a message of y is  received,  the decision-maker chooses x*(y), where
j  i w(x*(y),z) Sji >  Zj  Zi w(x,z)  Sji for all x£X,21
i.e.,  the decision-maker chooses x* to maximize the expected payoff.
Define
U*(a) =  z  zi wCw*(y),x) B..
J  i  'i
By the discussion above,
U*(O) = Zj  Aj  max Zi 0ij  w(x,z).
x
Marschak and Miyasawa  (1968) compare  the information content of two
alternative experiments Y and Y' and offer the following basic definition:
Y is more  informative than Y' if U*(8) >  U*(8').  It  is worthwhile noting
that  comparing "no information" to "perfect  information" is a special
case of  the general "more informative" comparison defined above.  If the
definition of the value of information given in the second section is
extended to the imperfect information setting, one has
VOI(Y)  =  U* (8)  - U*( ° )
VOI(Y')  =  U* (')  - U*(B )
where  ° is  such that  9eij=2i,  that  is,  the message and the value of the
parameter are  independent.  The experiment Y is defined as more informa-
tive than Y' if  its information content has higher value.
Returning to the development versus preservation problem at  hand,
the decision-maker solves
max  E {U1(D1,P1,Zl) + aU2(D2,P2,z2)}
ql'q2
s.t.  q  (0,1),  q2 C  [0,1-q  ).
Consider the development problem in  the second period.  Given a value of
ql  and having observed a message yj,  the problem is22
max  Z  8ei9  U2 (ql+q2,1-ql-q2,z2i )
q2c[0,1_l ] 1  i  J
Since I have assumed that the marginal utility of wilderness gets
infinitely large as  the stock of wilderness goes  to zero,  the solution
to  this problem is  strictly less  than 1-ql;  however, a zero  solution is
admitted.  Define  the Lagrangean function
L(q2 ,y;qlG j)  =  Zi  ij  U2(q+q2'l-ql-q2 z2i) + y  q2'  (27)
Since the problem is  one of concave programming and U is  strictly concave,
the first order necessary conditions  are sufficient  for a unique global
maximum.  These conditions are
au 2
ri 0ij [  (ql+q*,l-q'-q,1)  - ij aD  1  2' 2i)
(28)
au 2
Fp (ql+q*+l-ql-q*z2i)]  +  Y*=  0
Y* > 0, q* >0,  *q2  =  0  (29)
Denote the solution to this  second-period problem by q*(ql,0.),  i.e.,  the
function q* solves  (28) identically.  Further, let
L*(ql,e j )  =  L(ql,q(ql j ), j ').
By the complementary  slackness condition (19b),  L* is  identically equal to
the  expected value of the indirect utility function.
The development decision in the first period is obtained by solving
qmax 1  i  I  U(ql,l-qlgzli) + a Zj  Aj  L*(ql  ).
qlc(0,1)  1  1li23
The concavity of L* in  ql follows from the concavity of U2; hence,
since U1 is  strictly concave, the first  order necessary conditions  are
sufficient for a unique global maximum.  These are
3U1 3U  1
Ei  ili  [-  (ql'l-qlZli)  aP  (ql'l-qlpzli)]
i  "li  r7D_  (zlql-qr 2!)  - ap
(30)
+ a E. X.  a  =  0.
3  J  3q1
Let q*  (I,X)  denote the solution to this  equation.  The key  to the
analysis of q* is  the last  term in (30).  Note that, by the envelope
theorem,
- L  =y  >  0.
Hence,
L  (ql,ej)  < O.
Note that y  =  0 if q*(q,,e )  >  0.  That is,  the shadow price of passing
a marginal unit of undeveloped land to the next period is  zero if  that
land would be developed in that period.
Let ql be defined by
au  au
U1  m  1  m  m
i  li [-  (ql'l-qlzli)  - - -(qlml -q m  zli)]  = O.  (31)
If  the decision-maker solves  a static problem in  the first period so as
to maximize the expected value of utility while  ignoring irreversibility
and opportunities for learning, the optimal myopic level of development
m
is  ql 1
So  far, the analysis  is exactly as  in the previous section where z
is non-stationary except that here I have restricted the analysis  to a
finite (or countable) number of  possible states of nature.24
I next inquire into the effect  that the opportunity  to perform a
"more informative experiment" has on optimal first period development
decisions, where more informative is defined as  in Marschak and Miyasawa
(1968).  The key result is  the following
Lemma 2.  If Y is more  informative than Y',  then
Ej  j  p(ej)  >  E jm  p() j=l  -- j=l
for any convex function p defined on the  set of vectors  forming an  (m-l)
dimensional simplex.
Proof:  Marschak and Miyasawa (1968),  Theorem 12.1.
Thus,  if it  can be demonstrated that aL*/Iq l is  concave in  .j,  the
result q* < q  would follow immediately from Lemma 2.  Before proceeding,
it  is worthwhile pointing out  that the number Zj  Xj  aL*/3ql  is  the QOT
for the model at hand.  Thus, Lemma 2 would indicate that QOT is  an
increasing function of the informativeness of  the experiment to be
performed.
It  is worthwhile pointing out that  the value function L* itself
is convex in 8..
3
Theorem 2.  L*(ql,,9)  is convex in  ej.
Proof:  Define
Y(q2;qlej)  =  zi  U(q +q2,1-ql-q 2,z2 i),
and let q* solve
max  Y(q2;ql,  j)
q2
Let xE[O,l]  and define  Oa =  a6j +  Cl-a)9k for j #  k.  Clearly,
(ql;q2,9a)  =  aY(q 2 ;q l ,ej)  +  (1-a)T(q2;ql,0 k)25
Now, in general,
sup  {f+g}  <sup  sup  {f}  +  sup  {g}
Hence,
sup  {T(q2;ql,ea}  =  sup  {c(q 2 ;ql,6j)  + (1-U)(q2;ql,  k) }
C  a  sup {'(q 2;ql,  0)}  +  (1-a)  sup  {Y(q 2 ;qlek)}
= a  (q*;qlj)  +  (1-a)Y(q2;qlk) ,
whence
Y(q*;qlx.e  + (l-a)9k)  < aY(q;qlj)  +  (1-a)Y(q;ql  )
q.e.d
The implication of this  is  that one could proceed backwards, using Lemma 2
as a definition, and establish that more informative experiments have an
information content that has a higher value as Gould (1974) did  for
the special case of perfect  information.
The proof  that aL*/Aql  is  concave brings out  some interesting
implications of  the model of QOT.
Lemma 3.  3L*/Dql  is concave in 9..
J
Proof:  The envelope theorem informs  us  that  for small perturbations
of q1, the total change in the  indirect objective function can be calculated
without accounting for changes through the choice variable, i.e.  (ignoring
the time subscript on U),
L*/ql = i ij  [UD(ql+q*,l-q-qz2i ) - Up(ql+q*,1-ql-q*,z2)  ]
From the first order conditions  (28) and complementary slackness, if
q* > 0, then 3L*/ql =  0.  However, if q* =  0, then
L*/ql =i  ij  [UD(ql,l qlz2i  - Up(q 1,l-qlz 2 i)  ] < 026
This function is  linear in  6.  Thus,  the function aL*/aql  is concave
and piecewise linear.
q.e.d.
This lemma is the key step is establishing the basic result of
this  section.
Theorem 3.  If  a more informative experiment is  to be performed,
then less of the resource is  developed  in the  first period.
Proof:  Since DL*/aql  is  concave by Lemma 3, QOT is  convex by
definition.  Thus, by Lemma 2, a more informative experiment raises the
QOT.  The optimal first period investment decision is given by
UD - Up  =  QOT.
Since U is assumed  to be strictly concave in  (D,P),  the result follows.
q.e.d.
This result is  congenial to  intuition, for  it says that as more uncertainty
can be reduced in the  future,  flexibility becomes more valuable.  This  is
an obvious generalization of the perfect  information result established
in the previous section of  the chapter.
It  is important  to note  that if two message systems  are compared
and both of these systems  give rise to  expected values of z2 such that
the non-negativity constraint is  either binding or not binding, then no
change in first period behavior is  indicated.  This follows  since both
potential messages  lie on the same linear segment of  aL*/Iql.  By Jensen's
Inequality,  such a segment is both concave and convex and, from Lemma 2,
3L*/aql, and hence, q*,  is  unchanged.  If, on the other hand, one message
corresponds  to a binding constraint  in the second period and one corres-
ponds to a slack constraint,  then strictly less development in the first
period is  optimal.27
It  is of interest to inquire into how both the VOI  and QOT
respond to an increase in prior uncertainty regarding the parameter z,
where an increase in uncertainty is  defined as a mean preserving spread
(MPS) of the distribution function of z.  Formally, an MPS is  defined as:
Definition:  Let X, Y,  and Z be real random variables such
that E(Y[Z)  = O.  The X is  an MPS  of Z if X has the same
distribution as  the joint distribution of Y+Z.
The key result of  the arguments used here has been provided by Rothschild
and Stiglitz  (1970):
Lemma 4.  Let  f(b)  be a real valued function.  If f is convex
(concave) then the expected value of f is not decreased  (not
increased) when its argument is subjected to an MPS, with
strict inequality holding if the curvature is  strict.
Gould  (1974) has established that  if U is  linear  in z, the VOI
increases when F(z)  is  subjected to an MPS.  Gould's proof is  straight-
forward.  Recall  the definition of the VOI given in  (9):
VOI = E[U(X*,z)]  - E[U(x,z)].
The last term on the RHS  of  (9) is  linear and, therefore, by Lemma 4,
invariant  to an MPS of z.  Thus,  if the first term on the RHS of  (9) is
convex in z, an MPS of z increases its value and,  thereby, increases the
VOI as well.  If this term is differentiated twice with respect  to z,
one  finds that  it  is,indeed,convex.
Regarding QOT, it  is  immediate from Lemma 3 and 4 that QOT increases
with an MPS of z also.  The implication of this  is  that, if  the DM is28
relatively more uncertain regarding social preferences  for a particular
wildland tract,  then the marginal cost of  its development is increased.
In  some sense, any particular message system becomes relatively more
valuable when there is more uncertainty to be resolved and, by Theorem 3,
more flexibility in current decisions is  more valuable.
The Multi-Period Model
Extending  the analysis of the previous two sections  to a multi-
period setting is straightforward.  The results concerning QOT and the
VOI were  derived from a value  function which could  summarize optimal
behavior in the second period of a two-period model or summarize optimal
behavior over a longer time horizon.
The multi-period problem has  the same structure as  the two-period
problem:  in each time period the DM chooses  the level of new development
based on the amount of development up until that period and  the DM's
current probability function over z.  The DM, after implementing q, observes
the outcome of an experiment  at  the beginning of the next  time period and
updates his/her probability distribution over z using Bayes  Rule.  This
new distribution forms the basis  for the new choice of q.
Denote the probability distribution of z held by the DM at date t
by F . Then
F t = f(Ft,y+  ),
where f is  the map defined by Bayes Rule.
Let  the conditional distribution of Y given  the true value of the
parameter z  be H(ylz).  I assume  in this section that z is stationary.
Thus,  the sequence of observations of y is a sequence of  independently29
and identically distributed random variables drawn from the distribution H.
Moreover, the sequence of distributions F  forms  a stationary Markov process.
This structure allows me to call upon the basic mathematical results con-
cerning stationary Markov decision problems.  Toward this  end, I introduce
some terminology and notation.
Let the state of the system be seS,  where s=(D,F).  Define W(D,z) =
t  t+l U(D,l-D,z).  Finally, let g(Dt,F ,qt+,y  ) be the transition equation, t+1  t
which gives tomorrow's state (Dt+,Ft+  ) if  today's state is  (Dt,Ft),
action qt+l is implemented, and tomorrow's realization of the experiment
t+l is y
The DM wishes to solve
max  E Z  at W(Dt,z)
qt  t  (32)
.t  Dt+l  Dt + qt+l;  t > 0;  DtE[0,1].
At each date  the DM chooses q as a function of the current state,
i.e.,  qt+l-q(Dt,F ).  The function q is  called  a plan.  Given the plan q,
define the expected discounted return by
I(q)  (s) = E  [W(D° + q(D°,F°)] +  Z  at W(Dt_  + q(DtF  ) t - z)].
t=l  -l  -z
If Q is  the set of  all plans, the value function for the problem  (32) is
V(s)  =  sup  [I(q)(s)].
qEQ
Results concerning the decision problem (32) are stated with regard
to  the operator T defined by
TV(s) - sup {/ W(D+q,z) + a f  V(g(s,q,y)dH(ylz)  dF(z)}.  (33)
Z  Y
Naturally, g(s,q,y) =  (D+q,f(F,y)).30
If,  in addition to  the assumptions invoked so  far in  this chapter,
it is assumed  that U is bounded above, the transition probability
Prob  (Ft+lIFt)
is weakly continuous, and Z and Y are finite, then it may be shown that
T is a contraction map on a Banach space and, hence, has  a unique  fixed
point, the value function for  (32).  Moreover, it may be concluded that
the value function is a bounded, continuous,  concave  function, and that
there exists a unique, stationary, continuous, optimal plan q(s)  (Maitra,
1966; Easley and Spulber, 1982).  Further, Blume et.al.  (1982) show that
the value function is differentiable.
Thus, if the functions  V(.)  and L*(.)  are reinterpreted as value
functions for the infinite horizon problem (32),  all of the  results
derived above apply to solutions  to  that problem as well.
Discussion
So far, I have avoided any interpretation of the above model which
would give it "policy relevance."  In particular, I have avoided  any
statement of what constitutes experimentation.  In  this section, I offer
some interpretive comments.
In many economic models of Bayesian learning either demand or
technology  (or both) is uncertain and experimentation consists of obser-
vations of  current market outcomes.  Some investigators of QOV have this
type of process  in mind  in that experimentation consists of observing the
level of benefits  obtained  from providing certain stocks of  developed
and preserved areas.  This approach is quite clear in Arrow and Fisher
(1974,  p. 314).31
However, if  the multi-period,  imperfect learning model considered
here is to be non-trivial, this  approach is unsatisfactory  unless either:
(1) the DM does not know  Cand  cannot discover)  the function form of U('),
or (2) the parameter z varies  through time.  For, if the form of U is
known and  the level of  utility achieved can be observed, the parameter z
can be calculated, and the model collapses to  the two-period, perfect
learning case.-/ In  this case, one naturally wonders what prevented this
learning in any periods before t=O.
If zt varies through time, even if  the form of U(-)  is known, infor-
mation about past achieved levels of utility does not  (necessarily) provide
information about  future preferences.  However, if past  realizations of zt
and future ones are correlated,  then experimentation might consist of using
past utility levels  to uncover the process governing the movement of z  .
One plausible interpretation here is  that there exists an unknown distribu-
tion from which the zt are drawn and the DM's problem is  to simultaneously
estimate that distribution and choose the level of  current investment.
This type of model has been explored  in the literature  on Bayesian adaptive
control.  Note that, unlike the literature oriented toward analysis of
market outcomes where the problem of simultaneity of price expectations
formation and price formation must be confronted, I have avoided  this here
in positing the problem as  one facing a central authority.
An important  point  raised by the economic literature  in this  area
is  that I have implicitly assumed  that investment choices  and the informa-
tiveness  of  the experiment are independent.  Obviously,  if the DM can
produce information by choosing a larger investment, then the  conclusion
that less  of an area is  developed may not hold  (see Prescott, 1972;32
Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman,  1977;  and Freixas,  1981).  An analysis
of  this issue is  beyond the scope of  this paper.  However, it  is worth
pointing out that the  two approaches  to experimentation,  the production
of  information approach and that considered here, are applicable in
different decision-making situations.
Consider first the  situation in which the  development activity con-
sists  of energy exploration in potential wilderness.-  Obviously,  this
is an example of a case where development produces information about  the
value of more development.  An analysis of this situation would require a
re-examination of  the production of information literature in light of  the
irreversibility aspect of wilderness  development.11 L
Consider next the situation in which the development activity has
known benefits;  for example, the harvest of  (known) inventories  of  timber.
In  this  case, most of  the uncertainty in the problem surrounds  the value
of preservation, and it seems unlikely that harvesting more timber  con-
stitutes a more effective experiment concerning  the benefits of  providing
some amount of wilderness.
A plausible interpretation of  experimentation in this  latter situa-
tion, that  adopted in  this paper, is  that  a central authority  (e.g.,
a national Forest Service) is acting on behalf of its constituents  to
maximize community welfare.  The central authority ignores distributional
issues  (or uses distributional weights)  and conducts a benefit-cost type
analysis of alternative preservation policies.  However, since wilderness
is  a public good provided by the Forest Service, the benefits
of providing it  (the position of the compensated demands  for it)  are
unknown.  The experimenting authority tries to  estimate the willingness-
to-pay for wilderness by a variety of means.  In particular, it might33
estimate a demand curve for recreational aspects of wilderness provision
via a travel-cost approach, or undertake bidding-game analyses with a
sample of  its  constituents, or hold public hearings.  All of  these consti-
tute experimentation which provides some information to  the  agency about
the benefits  of providing wilderness.
Naturally, there are several questions raised by this  interpretation
that are not incorporated into the model above.  Specifically, I have not
addressed the menu of  experiments  that may be open to  the DM and how (s)he
might choose experiments  over time  (see, DeGroot,  1970).  Further, I
clearly have avoided any "bureaucratic behavior" interpretation of  the
function U(.)  and how the preferences of  individuals might relate to
preferences of a government agency.  And I have not discussed the strategic
implications  of experimenting via demand revealing processes  (see, e.g.,
Dasgupta, 1982).
There are several further issues that might be addressed in future
research.  Suppose that wilderness decisions  as well as development
decisions are sufficiently costly  to reverse as  to be considered
irreversible.  For example, declassification of wilderness  areas preserved
by law might prove politically impossible.  Then, a question arises  as  to
the amount of information that  should be obtained before a decision is
implemented.  In this sampling problem (and in the analysis of  this paper
as well) consideration should be made of the heterogeneity of  the resource
base and possibilities for substitution among wilderness  areas both for
wilderness services and the provision of  commodities.  One might seek,
then, an idea of how wilderness decisions should be structured over time.
Certainly,  making all decisions at  the initial date, or all decisions
after an equal delay, will not be optimal.FOOTNOTES
-/Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota.  Comments on an earlier draft by
Lawrence Blume, Richard Porter, and participants in the  Resource Economics
Seminar at the University of Michigan are appreciated.  In particular,
I would  like to thank Michael Moore for numerous  conversations on  these
matters.  Remaining errors and opacity are the responsibility of  the
author.  Financial assistance from Resources for the Future is gratefully
acknowledged.
/ The concept was developed by Weisbrod (1964) and has been much
discussed since.  For recent summaries of the literature, see Bishop  (1982),
Graham (1981), and Smith (1983).
3/ Further confusion is provided by alternative definitions of  the
VOI (e.g.,  Lindley, 1971; Antonovitz and Roe, 1982), which resemble QOV,
especially as the latter is presented by Henry (1974b).  This issue is
not explored here.  It is worthwhile pointing out that the approach of
Conrad (1981) is  the same as that of Gould (1974).
4/ Compare Oi (1961), Sandmo  (1971), and Hartman  (1976).  See
Epstein (1978) for a complete analysis.
5/ Thus, I posit "rational expectations" in that the subjective
distribution of the DM and the true distribution is the same.6/
- Note that  in his proof of a similar proposition, Henry  (1974b)
implicitly imposes an assumption that  ql=qm, without justification in  the
general case.
7/ / One difference that arises is  that in what  follows I restrict
attention to the finite or countable case, whereas in this  section, I did
not need to  impose this  restriction.  Thus,  there is not  a  perfect relation-
ship between the two sections.  However, a key result below  (Lemma 2)  has
not been proven in this more general setting.
8/
- Much of this material was completed  (and presented  to  the Resource
Economics Seminar at  the University of Michigan) before the author became
aware of  the  analysis of Epstein  (1980).  The exposition here follows this
latter work;  the substance of  the  two analyses was identical.
9/
- More precisely, it is a multi-period model where the payoff for
future periods is  summarized by a {max U(q,l-q,z*}/r.
q
-/ For a discussion of this  issue, see Runge  (1983).  Tiesberg  (1980)
considers exploration on public  lands, but does not analyze the situation
where the opportunity cost  of exploration  (foregone wilderness services) may
be growing in value over time.
1/  The degree of  irreversibility may not be absolute in this instance,
and should even be considered a choice variable.  This remark may apply to
many possible wilderness development projects.  Porter  (1982) discusses  this
issue in a model without uncertainty.REFERENCES
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